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Credit Supply, Homeownership and Mortgage Debt
Ahmet Ali Tas¸kın∗ Fırat Yaman†
Abstract
We analyse the effect of credit supply on households’ homeownership status and mortgage
debt, as well as other variables relating to housing costs and home equity. We demonstrate
that banking deregulation as enacted by the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
(IBBEA) together with states’ autonomy to set the degree and timing of deregulation provides
an exogenous shift in credit supply which shows variation across states and time. We use this
variation to isolate the effect of credit supply from confounding factors which could simultane-
ously affect credit supply and demand. Using a rich individual-level panel covering the period
1996 to 2008, and controlling for individual and region-year fixed effects, we find that a shift
from full regulation to full deregulation increases the probability of owning a home by one,
and of having a mortgage by two percentage points. The deregulation observed between 1990
and 2005 can explain at least one fifth, and up to 45% of the increase in homeowneship and
the share of households with mortgages. For observations residing in non-metropolitan areas,
we also find significant effects of deregulation on the amount of mortgage debt, reported home
values, monthly mortgage payments, and debt to value as well as debt to income ratios. Most
of these effects are driven by young households, and by individuals with higher incomes. Our
results inform on the causes of the rise in homeownership and mortgage debt in the 1990s and
2000s which have led up to the housing crisis in the late 2000s.
JEL classification: G21, G28, R21, R31
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Homeownership; Household finance
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1 Introduction
The United States have experienced two major housing booms in the post WW2 period. During
the first boom, between 1940 and 1960, the homeownership rate increased from 44 percent to 62
percent. After a long stable period, it started to rise again in the early 90s, from 64 percent in 1994
to 69 percent in 2004. Although the role of policy-induced credit availability in the first boom is
also substantial,1 the later boom benefited from a combination of homeownership promoting pol-
icy initiatives,2 changes in the structure of the mortgage market and ever increasing house prices.
All these developments spurred on a dramatic increase in the availability of mortgage credit and
relaxed lending standards which created a feedback cycle in house prices and in the likelihood
of becoming a homeowner.3 The later part of this cycle in the early 2000s and the subsequent
housing crash which unfolded the Great Financial Crisis in 2008 have received vast attention. Dis-
cussions about the causes and the consequences of the so called “housing bubble” are still ongoing.4
Although house prices and homeownership rates have been steadily increasing in the early 90s,
this build-up period is often overlooked since most of the plausible risk indicators – i.e. interest
rates, mortgage-backed securities boom, loan-to-value, and price-to-rent ratios etc. – showed little
or no sign of alarm until the beginning of the 2000s. This paper focuses on this build-up period and
exploits the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 as an exogenous
shift in credit supply and analyzes its effect on household homeownership and mortgage decisions
between 1996 and 2005 using micro data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP). The panel nature of the SIPP allows us to condition on the fixed individual characteristics,
hence we estimate the effect of a change in credit supply on the change in households’ housing
1Fetter (2013) argues that the self-amortizing long-term fixed rate mortgage with lower down payments, introduced
by the Federal Housing Administration, was a major factor in this increase.
2See Goodman and Mayer (2018) and Olsen and Zabel (2014) for an overview of housing policy developments.
3Agarwal et al. (2015) show that individuals who experience higher house price growth in their neighborhood
become homeowners earlier. This is consistent with the survey evidence in Case et al. (2012) that demonstrates the
role of expectations in future house price growth. For a theoretical argument see Kaplan et al. (2017).
4See Mian and Sufi (2009), Glaeser et al. (2013), Foote et al. (2016), Adelino et al. (2016), Di Maggio and Kermani
(2017), and Saadi (2016) for thorough discussion.
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tenure and mortgage debt decisions.
Our event of interest is branching deregulation. It was adopted in 1994 and made interstate
branching legal. However, states retained rights to put up several barriers for interstate branch
entries. Rice and Strahan (2010) showed that states lifted these barriers over time and constructed
a time-varying index capturing these differences in regulatory constraints between 1994 and 2005.
Following deregulation, states with lower barriers to entry experienced an increase in the share of
interstate branches (Johnson and Rice, 2008) and supply of bank branches overall (Ce´lerier and
Matray, 2019). Moreover, this branching expansion constituted a major shock to the housing mar-
ket: it increased mortgage supply both in originations and volume (Favara and Imbs, 2015). This
rise in mortgage supply fueled housing demand and increased house prices. The previous literature
has also shown that this index is unrelated to other real economic variables such as local economic
growth, employment and wages (Ce´lerier and Matray, 2019). We follow these papers in using the
interstate branch deregulation index as an exogenous measure of credit supply, and analyze indi-
vidual housing and mortgage decisions over the course of 2 to 4 years.
We find that credit supply induced by interstate branching expansion increases the likelihood
of being a homeowner and having a mortgage. This result is more prominent in rural5 locations
which seem to benefit more from the interstate branching expansion and ensuing competition.
Moreover, the effect is almost exclusively concentrated on young households, highlighting the life-
cycle nature of the housing decision as pointed out in Agarwal et al. (2015), Fisher and Gervais
(2011) and Attanasio et al. (2012). Low income households, on the other hand, do not seem to
benefit from this credit expansion. The estimates suggest that the increase in credit supply due
to branching expansion explains up to 1 percentage point (1.5 for young households) of the rise
in the homeownership rate during this period. The probability of having a mortgage increases by
up to 2 percentage points. This suggests that not only do renters become homeowners due to this
5We mostly use the word urban to describe MSAs with at least 100,000 inhabitants, and rural to mean non-urban.
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expansion of credit, but also outright homeowners take out loans on their houses. Our benchmark
estimates are able to explain one-fifth to half of the aggregate rise in the homeownership rate and
the share of mortgagors in the housing boom period.
We then focus on the households that already own a home and investigate the effect of credit
supply on mortgage debt, home valuation, and leverage as measured by debt-to-value and debt-
to-income as in Leth-Petersen (2010), Mian et al. (2013), and Sodini et al. (2016). We find that
refinancing existing mortgages was not particularly affected by this increase: only households that
live in rural areas extended further mortgage debt, and assessed an increase in the home value
against changes in credit supply. On the other hand, in line with Mian and Sufi (2009), we ob-
serve that low income individuals experienced an increase in mortgage debt against no home value
change. This shows that an increase in credit supply yields higher leverage for low income indi-
viduals. Finally, we find that for some households leverage rose with credit supply: households’
debt-to-income ratios, in line with Favara and Imbs (2015), increased significantly in rural areas.6
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways: First, we focus on the initial housing
expansion phase rather than the crisis, to better understand the causes of the housing bubble in
the first place. Second, we use individual level panel data which substantially mitigates concerns
with regards to selection of individuals into certain locations and its correlation with regulatory
differences between states. Third, we quantify the contribution of deregulation triggered by IBBEA
to the overall rise in homeownership and mortgagor shares. Fourth, the individual level data en-
able us to analyze the effect of credit supply on different locations (urban vs rural), demographics
(young vs old) and income groups (low income vs high income).
The US Housing boom and the consequent bust in 2008 attracted a lot of attention to the role
6This also reinforces the finding that credit supply increases due to interstate branching deregulation do not affect
the economic developments such as income and unemployment as in Ce´lerier and Matray (2019).
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of credit supply on house prices and homeownership. Glaeser et al. (2013) have argued that the
elasticity of house prices (or housing demand for that matter) is not sensitive to interest rates,
while others have found that relaxations of the terms of mortgage contracts other than interest
rates have contributed substantially to this housing cycle (Anenberg et al., 2017; Adelino et al.,
2012; Duca et al., 2011; DeFusco and Paciorek, 2017). Moreover, the increase in credit supply
has been attributed to a variety of policy measures such as the Community Reinvestment Act
(Saadi, 2016), pre-emption of anti-predatory-lending laws (Di Maggio and Kermani, 2017) and the
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (Favara and Imbs, 2015). We contribute to this
literature using the latter policy as a measure of credit supply and investigate its effects on individ-
ual housing tenure and mortgage debt outcomes. While most of this literature focuses on the years
2000 and after, we argue that it is also important to account for the sharp rise in homeownership
and mortgagor shares in the 1990s.
Our paper provides empirical insight into the theoretical discussion with regards to the role of
borrowing vs. lending constraints in promoting housing tenure decision and household leverage in
Justiniano et al. (2019) and Favilukis et al. (2017). Our policy instrument, interstate branching
expansion, has been shown to increase local bank competition with higher branch density and lower
interest rates (Ce´lerier and Matray, 2019; Rice and Strahan, 2010; Favara and Imbs, 2015). There-
fore, the increase in credit supply due to interstate branching expansion would most likely work
through a relaxation of lending constraints.7 We test whether the theoretical propositions implied
by a positive shift in lending hold in the individual data.
Our paper is further related to the literature that studies homeownership as a decision over the
life-cycle. The theoretical models argue that housing demand is strongly related to a large menu
of individual and aggregate factors such as marriage, earnings risk, local housing and rental price
7This is especially true in the early stages of expansion as multi-state banks carry their excess liquidity to the new
market. Gilje et al. (2016) show that banks that enjoy local liquidity inflows originate new loans in other localities
through their branches.
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volatility and credit constraints (Fisher and Gervais, 2011; Attanasio et al., 2012; Sinai and Souleles,
2005; Ortalo-Magne and Rady, 2006). The empirical literature demonstrates that changes in these
conditions have more profound effects on young households as they mostly affect the timing of the
homeownership decision (Agarwal et al., 2015; Fetter, 2013; Ortalo-Magne and Rady, 1999). Our
results suggest that the increase in credit supply due to interstate branching expansion strongly
shifted housing and mortgage demand of young households.
Finally, our paper contributes to the discussion on the extent of rising mortgage debt along
the income distribution. Mian and Sufi (2009) argue that despite stagnant growth in earnings
low-income neighborhoods experienced an uneven increase in mortgage debt in the early 2000s.
Adelino et al. (2012) and Foote et al. (2016) challenge this argument and claim that mortgage
growth took place in all income groups. We show that although the deregulation episode does not
yield an increase in housing demand for low income individuals in most of the cases, their leverage
against home equity rises. Moreover, we also find a slight surge in households’ leverage as measured
by debt-to-income ratios.
2 Background
Since the seminal paper by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), household credit constraints have been
modelled as a collateral limit against the home value. Numerous papers use relaxations of this
borrowing constraint to account for the housing boom in the 1990s and 2000s (Kiyotaki et al.,
2011; Sommer et al., 2013; Favilukis et al., 2017). In contrast, Justiniano et al. (2019) suggest a
slackening of lending constraints as an explanation for the housing boom. A relaxation of lending
constraints, they argue, matches four aggregate observations qualitatively and quantitatively: home
prices increased, and so did household debt. The debt to home value ratio remained stable, and
mortgage rates fell. In contrast, a relaxation in borrowing constraints should lead to an increase in
mortgage rates, and consequently a decrease in house prices.
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While the aggregate data support the lending constraint argument in Justiniano et al. (2019),
their calibration exercise does not give a clean identification of how key outcomes are affected by
an increase in credit supply, as they do not have arguably exogenous and precisely measured vari-
ation in credit supply. Instead, they argue that lending constraints have been relaxed by a general
increase in available mortgage credit through the spreading use of mortgage-backed securities and
other international factors.
One such exogenous change in credit supply has been identified and used by Johnson and Rice
(2008) and Rice and Strahan (2010) and subsequent papers (Favara and Imbs, 2015; Ce´lerier and
Matray, 2019). They construct an index of banking and branching deregulation which derives from
the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA), passed in 1994, which lifted restric-
tions on bank expansion across state limits, but gave states some discretion to limit the expansion
of out-of-state banks. The act allowed for mainly four provisions to limit bank expansion: 1) setting
a minimum age of the target institution for bank acquisitions, 2) prohibiting de-novo branching by
out-of-state banks, 3) setting a cap on the state-wide deposit concentration that a merger with an
out-of-state bank would create, and 4) prohibiting acquisition of bank branches by an out-of-state
bank. The IBBEA is described in detail in Rice and Strahan (2010) who construct a simple index
ranging from 0 to 4, measuring the number of restrictions that a state has in place in a given year
to suppress banking competition. We invert this index and call it deregulation index I for more
intuitive interpretation. Thus, I exhibits variation across states, and over time, as states change
the provisions that govern inter-state banking.
We thus put the predictions in Justiniano et al. (2019) to the test by looking at how key out-
comes in the housing market and the household balance sheet were affected by changes in the
regulatory framework of banking competition as captured by changes in the deregulation index.
Ce´lerier and Matray (2019) show that a complete deregulation increases the bank branch density
7
Table 1: Deregulation and bank branch density
Log bank branch density By population By area
All counties MSAs only All counties MSAs only
Deregulation index 0.0607*** 0.0180** 0.0620*** 0.0201**
(0.0151) (0.0080) (0.0151) (0.0088)
Deregulation index × -0.0434*** -0.0227*** -0.0452*** -0.0261***
Urban (0.0127) (0.0054) (0.0140) (0.0069)
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes no yes no
MSA × year fixed effects no yes no yes
Number observations 34,441 10,031 34,441 10,031
Notes: Observations are county-years. The observation period is 1994-2006. The first two
columns measure bank branch density as number of bank branches per 1,000s of people. The
last two columns measure it per square mile of area. The odd columns include all counties,
the even columns include only counties within an MSA. All variables are at the county
level, except the deregulation index, which is at the state level. All regressions include the
change in income per capita, log of income per capita, log of population, unemployment
rate, and poverty rate of the county. Standard errors are clustered by state and reported in
parentheses. *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1.
in a county by 20 percent, lending support to using the index change as a proxy for credit supply
increases. At the same time, they show that the index does not correlate with income or employ-
ment at the county level, thus arguing that the index is truly an exogenous measure of banking
competition. Similarly, Rice and Strahan (2010) find no correlation between economic conditions
and the deregulation index for their sample period, and Favara and Imbs (2015) show that the
index does not correlate with lending by lenders who were not affected by deregulation, ruling out
concerns of reverse causality and omitted variable bias.
Since the credit supply shock delivered by the IBBEA works through the increase in bank
branches and the ensuing competition, it would follow that the deregulation would have its strongest
impact for households who live in areas which are not saturated with bank branches, that is areas
with low branch density in counties with smaller populations. Using a similar approach as Ce´lerier
and Matray (2019) we regress county level bank branch density against the deregulation index to-
gether with its interaction with Urban – a dummy variable equal to one if the county’s population
8
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Figure 1: Graphs show the estimated effect of deregulation on the log of bank branch density for
counties by population quintile. The vertical bars cover the 95% confidence interval. The upper
(lower) graphs define branch density as number of bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants (per square
mile). The y-axes are not on the same scale.
is above 100,000 – and other county-level control variables.8 The results in Table 1 clearly confirm
that bank branch density has increased after deregulation mostly in non-urban and smaller urban
counties, in line with our expectations.
The differential effects between urban and non-urban is not just an artifact of dividing them
at the 100,000 threshold. Figure 1 summarizes results from regressions which instead estimate the
effect of deregulation for each quintile of the population distribution of counties. Using all counties
(left-hand side), we can see that deregulation increases bank branch density mostly in counties in
the second population quintile. The effect is strong in the first quintile, too, but peters out for
higher quintiles. For counties within MSAs only (right-hand side), we observe an unambiguously
monotonic relationship: The smaller the county’s population, the stronger the effect of deregulation
8Data on bank branches come from the Sum of Deposits (SOD) maintained by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Fund (FDIC). We observe for each bank branch its zip code. The data are annual, from 1994 to 2006. Information
on population, per capita income, the unemployment and the poverty rate are from the Census Bureau, the Bureau
of Labor and Statistics, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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on the increase in bank branch density.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
Our empirical models are of the form
Yisrt = β0 + β1Isrt + β
′
2Xit + β
′
3Zsrt + ci + drt + isrt (1)
where Y is our dependent variable (described below), I is the deregulation index described in
the previous section, X is a vector of person characteristics, Z a vector of state characteristics,
and the subscripts refer to person i, year t, state s and census region r. We index also by the
latter because the regressions include census region–year fixed effects drt, which capture regional
business-cycle effects. We also include individual fixed effects ci to capture individual traits and
characteristics which affect the outcome variable.
The model is a difference-in-differences estimator with different degrees of treatment. Holding
X and Z fixed, for a person living in a state in census-region r which keeps deregulation unchanged,
the change in the outcome is simply dr,t+1− drt. For a person living in the same census region but
whose state of residence deregulates by one index point, the change in the outcome variable would
be dr,t+1 − drt + β1. The inclusion of person fixed effects implies that identification of the coeffi-
cients rests on within-person variation of the variables. Thus, a significant estimate of β1 could not
be a result of changes in the composition of the population of a state, but can only be attributed
to a change in I causing a change in the (average) behavior of a person which induces a change in Y .
Data We use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), in particular
the 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels. The SIPP is described in detail elsewhere,9 so we highlight its
9Data are available online: http://www.nber.org/data/survey-of-income-and-program-participation-sipp-
data.html. User guides are available on the website of the US Census Bureau.
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features relevant to our study. The SIPP is a panel study covering three (the 2001 panel) to four
(the 1996 and 2004 panels) years, and individuals are surveyed every four months. A battery of
core questions are asked for each wave. In addition, each wave contains a changing topical module
which can cover topics such as well-being, health, fertility history, and assets and liabilities. The
assets and liabilities module is included in every third wave of the panels and forms the basis for
our variables relating to mortgage characteristics. After merging the assets and liabilities module
with the corresponding wave of the core data, we end up with a panel at annual frequency — we
do not use the waves whose topical modules did not cover assets and liabilities. The sample is
completely renewed with each new SIPP panel so that, even though our data span twelve years,
each person is observed for no more than four years.
Our independent variable of interest — the deregulation index — varies across states and over
time. We therefore remove observations in the SIPP who move across states as such a move would
possibly endogenously determine the value of the index. To abstract from questions of how assets
and liabilities are divided or pooled upon a division or merging of households, we consider only
observations whose marital status does not change over the panel period.10 For homeowners, we
restrict our attention to households who report to own the house and drop the rest of household
members who live under the same dwelling with no share on the ownership. We only consider
individuals aged between 21 and 65 as changes in ownership and mortgage debt are rare outside
of this age range. Finally, as we rely on person fixed effect for identification, we use individuals
with multiple observations over time after these filters. This leaves us with 237,376 person-year
observations between 1996 and 2005.
We consider the following dependent variables: 1) Is Homeowner is a dummy equal to 1 if
the person is a (joint) owner of the occupied dwelling, 2) Has Mortgage is a dummy equal to
1 if the person has a mortgage or home equity loan on their home, and 0 otherwise (including if
10In the raw data interstate migration is around 3.5 percent and marital status change is 5.2 percent.
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they rent). 3) Log Mortgage Debt is the natural logarithm of the amount of mortgage debt, 4)
Log Home Value is the natural logarithm of the reported value of the home, 5) Log Mortgage
Payment is the natural logarithm of the monthly mortgage payment, 6) Log Rent is the natural
logarithm of the monthly rent payment, 7) Debt to Value is the ratio of mortgage debt to the
reported home value, and 8) Debt to Income is the ratio of mortgage debt to monthly house-
hold earned income.11 We drop observations for whom wealth variables (including homeownership
and mortgage status) are imputed, following Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) and Ce´lerier and Matray
(2019), due to the unreliability of imputed results regarding wealth variables.
Our person-specific variables are: whether the person’s household has received any income from
assets in the last four months (dummy), whether the person’s household has received any unem-
ployment benefits in the last four months (dummy), dummies for belonging to each decile of the
real household earned income distribution (across all years and observations), the number of adults
in the household, and the number of persons below 18 in the household. The state characteristics
we control for are: the unemployment rate, the natural logarithm of the state population, and the
natural logarithm of per capita income.
In addition to the above, we check the heterogeneous effect of deregulation on demographic
classifications. The branch density analysis in the previous section demonstrated that locations
with lower population experience a further increase in branch density after the deregulation. Ac-
cordingly, we check whether this expansion of branching has stronger effects on individual housing
and mortgage outcomes in rural locations. We therefore classify a person as Urban if they live
in a metropolitan area (MSA) with a population of at least 100,000, and Rural otherwise.12 We
11Each SIPP wave collects information on income for the reference period, that is, the previous four months. We
average these values to construct monthly household income.
12All panels have an identifier for whether a household lives in an MSA. The 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels also
identify the MSA a person lives in only when the population is at least 100,000. The 2004 SIPP does not disclose the
identity of the MSA. For the latter panel we are restricted to use more broad MSA identifier for Urban classification.
While we do not use the identity of an MSA, we treat unidentified MSAs in the 1996 and 2001 panels as rural to have
a more balanced division of our sample between urban and rural, at the cost of not having a consistent classification
across panels. Classifying any MSA as urban does not change results for our full and rural samples. For the urban
12
further classify the households by their age as the decision of housing and related debt instruments
depend heavily on the life-cycle events.13 Therefore, credit demand response with respect to an
expansion of credit supply is age dependent. To address these potentially diverse responses, we
classify a person as Young if they are between 21 and 45 when they are first observed in the panel,
and Old otherwise. Finally, we introduce heterogeneity at the income margin to assess the change
in credit risk due to this deregulation. For that purpose, a person is classified as having low income
if their household earned income is below twice the poverty threshold as defined by the SIPP. This
threshold adjusts for number of household members and age of the household head. In analysing
heterogeneity along the above dimensions, we decided to split the samples by location and age, but
account for income heterogeneity by including an interaction term between the low income dummy
and the deregulation index. Movements between urban and rural areas for individuals are negli-
gible, and between age classifications impossible, while transitions between income classifications
are more common. Splitting the sample by income could allocate the same individual to different
sub-samples over time and be a source of sample-selection bias.
Table 2 presents an overview of our data. The first column reports means for the first year
of the 1996 panel (31%), and the second means for the first years of the merged 2001 and 2004
panels (69%), where all means are taken over individuals (e.g. even for state-wide variables). The
third column shows the difference between the two samples. We observe a pronounced increase
in the deregulation index by more than one index point. At the same time, the differences in
means for all our outcomes variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. The directions
of the changes are reflecting the aggregate observations documented for this period in Justiniano
et al. (2019): the likelihood of being a homeowner and having a mortgage increased by more than
4%, a dramatic development leading to the housing boom.14 Mortgage debt and house prices
sample, the only difference is in the effect of deregulation on homeownership and having a mortgage. See section 5
and appendix table A1 for further discussion and results.
13For modeling the housing tenure decision over the life cycle see Fisher and Gervais (2011) and Attanasio et al.
(2012).
14The share of mortgagors among homeowners rose about 2 percent in the same period.
13
Table 2: Means of variables, by panel
Panel 1996 2001 and 2004 Difference
Main independent variable
Deregulation index 0.946 1.985 1.039***
Outcomes
Is Homeowner (in %) 63.4 67.5 4.1***
Has Mortgage (in %) 49.0 53.4 4.3***
Log Mortgage Debt 10.91 11.30 0.40***
Log Home Value 11.54 11.96 0.42***
Log Mortgage Payment 6.51 6.76 0.25***
Log Rent 6.16 6.36 0.21***
Debt to Value 0.587 0.578 -0.009***
Debt to Income 17.5 21.1 3.6***
Household controls
Log earned household income (real) 8.028 8.105 0.077***
Has asset income (in %) 66.3 65.7 -0.6*
Receives unemployment benefits (in %) 3.4 3.5 0.0
Household members 3.110 3.054 -0.056***
Children in household 0.971 0.911 -0.059***
State controls
Unemployment rate 5.53 5.10 -0.43***
Log per capita income 10.07 10.35 0.28***
Log population 15.97 15.90 -0.06***
Notes: Sample only includes the first wave with asset and liability infor-
mation (wave 3) from each panel. *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, *
p-value<0.1.
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also experienced sharp increases (40% and 42% in nominal terms). To put this into context, the
increase in the baseline consumer price index between 1996 and 2003 is recorded to be around 17%.
Monthly mortgage payments also increased, but not much more than rents. Since home values
increased more than mortgage debt, the debt to value ratio has decreased. At the same time, we
can also see that household level and state level characteristics have not stayed fixed over time. For
example, households’ earned income has increased by close to 8%, but the fraction of households
enjoying income from assets has dropped. Unemployment rates have risen. There is thus a need to
employ regression analysis to isolate the effect of deregulation from these confounding changes at
the household and state level.
4 Results
Table 3 summarizes the main results. Panel A reports the effect of deregulation by one index point
on the probability of becoming a homeowner (left) and on having a mortgage (right). For the full
sample we observe that going from a state of full regulation (0) to full deregulation (4) of inter-state
banking increases the probability of becoming a homeowner by one percentage point (4 × 0.0026)
and the probability of having a mortgage by almost two percentage points (4 × 0.0048). Both
effects are significant at the 1% level. Since the effect on having a mortgage is twice the effect on
being a homeowner, and both regressions are run on the same sample, some of the new mortgages
taken out in response to deregulation are for new home purchases, and others are home equity
loans. In further regressions (not reported) we find that deregulation by one index point increases
the probability of the former by 0.59 and the latter by 0.38 percentage points.15 Distinguishing
by location, we observe that the effects are almost entirely drive n by rural observations, lending
support to our hypothesis that rural areas are more likely to see an increased penetration by new
bank branches than more saturated, urban areas. Indeed, the effect of deregulation for the urban
15We arrive at these results by regressing the Has Mortgage variable on the deregulation index, separately by
homeownership status, while constraining all other variables’ effects to be equal to the coefficients estimated for the
full sample (so that a regression on the deregulation index on the full sample would again yield the original coefficient
of 0.48). Homeownership status is determined by the initial status observed in the panel.
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Table 3: The effect of easier credit supply
Sample Full Urban Rural Full Urban Rural
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Ownership Status Is Homeowner Has Mortgage
Coefficient 0.0026*** 0.0004 0.0033** 0.0048*** 0.0013 0.0075***
Standard errors (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0029)
Number observations 237,376 152,731 82,028 237,376 152,731 82,028
B: Home Equity Log Mortgage Debt Log Home Value
Coefficient 0.0041 -0.0136 0.0308*** 0.0049 -0.001 0.0156**
Standard error (0.0076) (0.0115) (0.0094) (0.0045) (0.0057) (0.0073)
Number observations 89,515 59,866 29,228 136,564 88,133 47,875
C: Housing Cost Log Mortgage Payment Log Rent
Coefficient 0.0037 -0.0026 0.0169** -0.0077** -0.0109*** -0.0012
Standard error (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0066) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0066)
Number observations 101,367 67,804 33,126 44,376 30,411 12,996
D: Leverage Debt to Value Debt to Income
Coefficient 0.0008 -0.0027 0.0053* 0.0791 -0.0365 0.2659**
Standard error (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0774) (0.0906) (0.1172)
Number observations 86,064 57,672 27,984 83,980 56,159 27,411
Notes: The coefficients report the estimated effect of a relaxation of inter-state banking by one index
point. The full sample comprises of all observations aged 21 to 65 at the beginning of the observation
period, who do not move across states and do not change their marital status over their observation
period. The Urban (Rural) sample refers to observations (not) residing in MSAs with a population of
at least 100,000. All regressions control for individual and region-year fixed effects, number of household
members, number of children under 18 in the household, and dummies for: the presence of asset income, the
receipt of unemployment benefit, each household earning decile. State-wide controls are the unemployment
rate, population, and per capita income. Standard errors are clustered by state-years and reported in
parentheses. *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1.
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Table 4: Deregulation and the housing market 1990 to 2005
Is Homeowner Has Mortgage
Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual
1990 0.612 0.612 0.478 0.478
2005 0.643 0.624 0.525 0.512
Change 1990 to 2005 0.031 0.013 0.047 0.035
Explained change 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.011
Share explained 18% 45% 22% 31%
Notes: Homeownership rates and share of mortgagors in 1990 (US census) and 2005 (Ameri-
can Community Survey). The counterfactual share measures what the share of the respective
variable would have been, if the ratio of young to old people had been the same as in 1990.
The explained change is the change in the respective variable that can be explained by the
deregulation that occurred over this time period. It is the (population-) weighted average
across states of the change in the deregulation index times the estimated effect of deregula-
tion on ownership and mortgage status (Table 3). The last row quantifies the proportion of
the change in the respective variable that can be accounted for by the explained change.
sample is much smaller and insignificant.
How much of the observed increase in the share of homeowners and mortgagors could be ex-
plained by this deregulation? To answer this question we compute the counterfactual increase in the
share of homeowners and mortgagors based on states’ deregulation experiences over the expansion
period (1994-2005) and corresponding estimates reported in Table 3. We first calculate homeown-
ership and mortgagor shares using Census micro data and the same age categories introduced in the
previous section.16 Table 4 shows that between 1990 and 2005 the homeownership rate increased
by 3.1 percent and the mortgagor share increased by 4.7 percent. For each state, we multiply the
coefficient on the deregulation index from table 3 with the change in regulation observed in that
state, thus obtaining its predicted change in ownership due to de-regulation. We then take the
population-weighted average of the predicted changes to calculate the explained change. Interstate
branching expansion due to deregulation alone induces a 0.6 percentage point increase in home-
ownership and 1.1 percentage point increase in the mortgagor share. Overall, this explains about
one fifth of the increase in this period. This calculation, however, does not account for population
16We rely on the IPUMS 5 percent 1990 Census sample for the pre policy period and IPUMS 2005 American
Community Survey for the post policy period.
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ageing in the same period. If we were to fix the young-old distribution in 1990 levels, the observed
increases in the homeownership rate and the mortgagor share are much smaller. In that counter-
factual scenario the deregulation experience explains up to one-half of the observed change.
Turning to variables characterizing home equity (Panel B), in the full sample we do not observe
any effects on the value of mortgage debt nor on the home values as reported by the interviewees.
However, as for ownership, we do find strong effects of deregulation on both variables in our rural
sample — mortgage debt increases by 3% and reported home values by 1.6% per index point. Note
that the effect on mortgage debt is not driven by new mortgage originations. Since we control for
individual fixed effects, it is the change in existing mortgage debt as a response to a change in the
regulation index that identifies the coefficient. While the right side of panel A is informative on
the extensive margin of the mortgage market, the left part of panel B tells us something about the
intensive margin of existing mortgagors. The fact that we find an insignificant effect of deregulation
on home values in the full sample begs further inquiry as it is in contrast to both theoretical pre-
dictions of a credit supply shock (Justiniano et al., 2019) as well as the empirical finding in Favara
and Imbs (2015). For home value analysis, we use the self-reported assessment by the interviewee.
This is a biased proxy for market values as shown in Chan et al. (2016): Homeowners with mort-
gage debt systematically misreport home values against the developments in the housing market.
Moreover, homeowners with no debt on the house are less likely to have a good assessment on
market prices. To check whether this drives our results, we include a mortgage dummy in the home
value regressions. Results in Table A3 in the appendix suggest that in almost every specification
homeowners having a mortgage report an increase in home value compared to outright owners. The
effect of deregulation on home values conditional on obtaining a new mortgage is still the same for
all areas.
Panel C displays the estimated effects of deregulation on the monthly mortgage payments of
mortgagors (left) and rent payments of renters (right). Mortgage payments show an increase of
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1.7% per index point in the rural sample, but are not affected in the urban sample. An increase in
mortgage payments could be due to more mortgage debt, higher interest on the debt, or a reduction
in the years to maturity. Holding maturity and the amount of debt constant one could think of
changes in mortgage payment as proxy for cost of borrowing. The data shows little variation in
terms of maturity and (unreported) results controlling for the amount of mortgage debt demon-
strate similar coefficients. This suggests that the increase in credit supply due to deregulation did
not lower the cost of borrowing reported by the households. Theoretically, it is possible that a
relaxation of borrowing constraints (via loan-to-value or loan-to-income limits) could lead to a rise
in the interest rate as opposed to a relaxation in lending constraints (Justiniano et al., 2019). It is
therefore important to identify whether interstate branching deregulation also caused a relaxation
on borrowing constraints. The analysis below on housing leverage sheds further light into this.17
When we look at the housing costs from the point of renters (right side of panel C), we find that
in urban areas credit expansion induced a reduction of rents by 1% per index point. In principal,
if housing in the owner and rental markets are not perfect substitutes, more homeownership could
reduce rents by decreasing demand for rented accommodation. Indeed, Gete and Reher (2018)
show that the decline in mortgage supply after the Great Recession induced an increase in housing
rents. However, we observe an increase in mortgage payments due to deregulation for the rural
sample, while the reduction in rents occurs for the urban sample. We will revisit this issue in the
next section.
Panel D focuses on variables relating to home equity and risk exposure. The (outstanding) loan
to value ratios (left side) in the full sample are not affected. This is not surprising given that the
effect of deregulation on debt and reported home values are very close (Panel B), and also in line
17The SIPP also provides information on the interest rate of the first two mortgages. However, this measure suffers
from measurement errors due to inconsistent reportings over time (especially individuals with multiple mortgages)
and difficulties in assessing the variable rate mortgages which became more prominent later in the sample. Unreported
results on interest rates do not provide any significant effects.
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with the argument in Justiniano et al. (2019) that higher credit supply would increase debt and
asset prices in roughly equal measure. Only in rural areas did the increase in mortgage debt exceed
the increase in home values slightly, thus driving up the loan to value ratios. Home prices might
be overvalued and at any rate are much more volatile than income. Moreover, self-reported home
valuation does not necessarily mark to market as argued in Chan et al. (2016). A better measure
of risk exposure is debt to earned income (right side), since the former needs to be served by the
latter. Here we see an increase in rural areas. For a given income, the amount of mortgage debt
would increase by a month’s earned household income for states which go from full regulation to
full deregulation. This suggests that deregulation induces an increase in household leverage though
it is not economically sizeable. We conclude that interstate branching deregulation has limited
effects on household credit risk due to leverage.18
Taken together, we find stark differences of the effect of deregulation between urban and rural
areas. Ce´lerier and Matray (2019) find that the same deregulation index increased bank branch
densities in poorer counties within a state and the financial inclusion of poorer individuals. Thus,
it is not a surprise to see the effect mainly outside of larger cities. Urban areas already had high
bank branch penetration and financial inclusion to begin with, while in less dense areas there
was scope for banks to expand and increase competition. For the rural sample, most results are
in accordance with similar findings in the literature. Following deregulation more people bought
homes, more mortgages were issued, and mortgage loan volumes increased, as did reported home
values. Furthermore, LTV ratios increased, and so did debt to income ratios. We next explore
which demographic groups, segmented by age and income, were more affected by the deregulation.
18Mian and Sufi (2009) and Mian and Sufi (2017) suggest that credit expansion in early 2000s yield dramatic rise
in household leverage. For an opposing view see Adelino et al. (2016) and Foote et al. (2016).
20
Table 5: The effect of easier credit supply on owning a home
By age
All Young Old
By location (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: All
Deregulation index 0.0026*** 0.0042*** 0.0036*** 0.0052*** 0.0014 0.0016
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0014)
Deregulation index × -0.0071*** -0.0091*** -0.0004
Low income (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0023)
B: Urban
Deregulation index 0.0004 0.0017 0.0003 0.0014 0.0008 0.0017
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0012)
Deregulation index × -0.0066*** -0.0064 -0.0035
Low income (0.0025) (0.0042) (0.0024)
C: Rural
Deregulation index 0.0033** 0.0039** 0.0041* 0.0045* 0.0021 0.0015
(0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0029)
Deregulation index × -0.0024 -0.0016 0.0015
Low income (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0037)
Notes: Dependent variable: Dummy equal to one if observation owns dwelling. The deregulation index
ranges from 0 to 4. Low income is a dummy equal to one if the observation’s household income is below
twice the poverty level. The Young (Old) sample includes observations aged 21(46) to 45(65). The
Urban (Rural) sample includes observations (not) residing in an MSA with a population of at least
100,000. All regressions include the same controls as listed in the notes to table 3. Standard errors in
parentheses. *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1.
4.1 Ownership Status
Table 5 and Table 6 present detailed results on the effect of deregulation on homeownership and
having a mortgage, respectively. The panels A to C distinguish the samples by location. Even-
numbered columns present results from regressions which include the deregulation index, as well as
the interaction of the index with a dummy for low income households, while odd-numbered columns
refer to regressions which do not include this interaction term. Columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample
to observations younger than 46 when they were first observed in the data, and columns 5 and 6
to observations aged 46 to 65. The first two columns do not restrict the sample by age.
The first columns of both tables repeat the results from table 3, panel A, with the familiar
result that deregulation leads to increased homeownership and mortgage origination in rural areas.
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Table 6: The effect of easier credit supply on holding a mortgage
By age
All Young Old
By location (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: All
Deregulation index 0.0048*** 0.0058*** 0.0062*** 0.0081*** 0.0032 0.0008
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0031)
Deregulation index × -0.0043 -0.0108*** 0.0087*
Low income (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0049)
B: Urban
Deregulation index 0.0013 0.0020 0.0011 0.0024 0.0022 0.0010
(0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0039)
Deregulation index × -0.0034 -0.0075* 0.0050
Low income (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0047)
C: Rural
Deregulation index 0.0075*** 0.0074** 0.0103*** 0.0113*** 0.0037 -0.0006
(0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0050)
Deregulation index × 0.0004 -0.0044 0.0126
Low income (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0087)
Notes: Dependent variable: Dummy equal to one if observation holds a mortgage. See notes to table
5 for further information.
Our extended results reveal that this effect is mainly driven by younger individuals (columns 3 and
4). This is not surprising as homeownership is a life-cycle decision and changes in credit conditions
would affect individuals’ timing of purchasing a home. In this particular case, homeownership
among the young was in secular decline since the 1980s (Fisher and Gervais, 2011). The mortgage
credit expansion seems to decelerate this trend. Turning to income heterogeneity, in the complete
sample (both by location and age), we see that the benefits of easier homeownership accrue entirely
to high-income individuals, suggesting that the marginal individual to benefit from deregulation
did not fall into the low income category as we defined it. While there are some nuances (e.g.,
there is no significant difference between young low-income and young high-income individuals in
rural areas), the general finding is that individuals who are young and enjoy higher incomes have
been affected most positively in terms of their probability of becoming homeowners. As expected,
the findings are similar for holding a mortgage with more sizable effects. Here, too, deregulation
affects mainly the young, and those on relatively higher incomes.
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4.2 Home Equity
Next we look in detail at components of home equity. Table 7 shows results for the log of mortgage
debt, and Table 8 for the log of reported home value. Young individuals in the rural sample increase
their mortgage debt by 4% per index point, if they have high incomes, but not at all if their income
is low (Table 7, panel C, column 4). Unlike for the case of simply having a mortgage, we also
find that deregulation increases the mortgage debt amount of old individuals with low incomes
compared to old individuals with high incomes, at least in urban areas. What drives these results?
We think the most intuitive explanation is that young individuals become more likely to take out
a mortgage, while older — and poorer — individuals become more likely to draw more debt on
their home equity. On the other hand, young and better-off individuals in rural areas might be
benefiting from more competition among lenders to secure larger loans. As for home values, the
only significant result we find is for young and rural individuals. Here, too, it is mainly home
owners with higher incomes who report higher home values after deregulation. Since this is the
same demographic to have seen an increase in mortgage debt, these individuals might have better
or more recent information about home values. Alternatively, since their debt has increased, they
might be psychologically inclined to believe that the market value of their homes increases so as to
keep their net position stable. Results in Chan et al. (2016) suggest support for this phenomenon.
4.3 Housing Cost
We look at how deregulation has affected the cost of housing for mortgagors (Table 9) and renters
(Table 10). Mortgage payments mostly mirror the results for mortgage debt as ceteris paribus
more debt would imply higher monthly payments. Those individuals whose debt increased (young,
rural) have to make higher payments. The size of the effect is 1.7% while the effect on mortgage
debt was 3.1% (table 7). Young and urban individuals, on the other hand, experienced a slight
decrease in mortgage payment implying a potential fall in borrowing costs. Keeping mortgage debt
and maturity constant, household refinancing together with declining mortgage interest rates could
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Table 7: The effect of easier credit supply on amount of mortgage debt (in logs)
By age
All Young Old
By location (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: All
Deregulation index 0.0041 0.0022 0.0111 0.0116* -0.0075 -0.0156
(0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0134) (0.0150)
Deregulation index × 0.0220 -0.0093 0.0608*
Low income (0.0229) (0.0328) (0.0358)
B: Urban
Deregulation index -0.0136 -0.0182 -0.0101 -0.0112 -0.0214 -0.0332
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0088) (0.0081) (0.0197) (0.0223)
Deregulation index × 0.0529* 0.0190 0.0848*
Low income (0.0297) (0.0465) (0.0444)
C: Rural
Deregulation index 0.0308*** 0.0329*** 0.0369*** 0.0403*** 0.0186 0.0169
(0.0094) (0.0103) (0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0182) (0.0186)
Deregulation index × -0.0240 -0.0490 0.0137
Low income (0.0317) (0.0370) (0.0480)
Notes: Dependent variable: Log of amount of mortgage debt. Sample includes only observations with
positive mortgage debt. See notes to table 5 for further information.
Table 8: The effect of easier credit supply on amount of reported value of home (in logs)
By age
All Young Old
By location (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: All
Deregulation index 0.0049 0.0063 0.0128** 0.0140** -0.007 -0.0037
(0.0045) (0.0049) (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0050) (0.0064)
Deregulation index × -0.0106* -0.0160 -0.0004
Low income (0.0063) (0.0122) (0.0074)
B: Urban
Deregulation index -0.001 0.0000 0.0052 0.0054 -0.0115 -0.0068
(0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0089)
Deregulation index × -0.0082 -0.0033 -0.0059
Low income (0.0072) (0.0127) (0.0099)
C: Rural
Deregulation index 0.0156** 0.0180** 0.0273*** 0.0311*** 0.0004 -0.0007
(0.0073) (0.0087) (0.0100) (0.0109) (0.0096) (0.0119)
Deregulation index × -0.0142 -0.0376* 0.0096
Low income (0.0115) (0.0219) (0.0124)
Notes: Dependent variable: Log of amount of reported home value. Sample includes only home owners.
See notes to table 5 for further information.
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Table 9: The effect of easier credit supply on amount of monthly mortgage payment (in logs)
By age
All Young Old
By location (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: All
Deregulation index 0.0037 0.0047 0.0028 0.0031 0.0050 0.0070
(0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0056) (0.0061)
Deregulation index × -0.0098* -0.0039 -0.0137
Low income (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0098)
B: Urban
Deregulation index -0.0026 -0.0023 -0.0066* -0.0067* 0.0030 0.0041
(0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0062) (0.0065)
Deregulation index × -0.0037 0.0012 -0.0079
Low income (0.0066) (0.0095) (0.0091)
C: Rural
Deregulation index 0.0169** 0.0191*** 0.0177** 0.0186** 0.0134 0.0185
(0.0066) (0.0070) (0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0124) (0.0140)
Deregulation index × -0.0191* -0.0100 -0.0287
Low income (0.0098) (0.0111) (0.0188)
Notes: Dependent variable: Log of amount of monthly mortgage payment. Sample includes only
observations with positive mortgage payments. See notes to table 5 for further information.
lead to this result. Renters seem to have benefited from deregulation, especially young renters in
Urban areas. It is conceivable that demand for rented housing might have dropped as demand
for owner-occupied housing increased, even though the increase in ownership and decrease in rents
seem to be happening in geographically separate markets. Low income renters do not seem to be
affected any differently from high income renters in a statistically significant sense.
4.4 Leverage
Finally, we look more closely at variables relating to individuals’ home equity and risk exposure.
Table 11 reports the estimated effects of deregulation on mortgage debt to home value ratios, and
Table 12 on mortgage debt to household income ratios. On average, we have seen that for rural
observations home values have increased (Table 8), but the debt on their homes has increased even
more (Table 7) leading to an overall increase of debt to value ratios in rural areas. This has been
the case for both high- and low-income individuals. In urban areas we detect a decrease in this ratio
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Table 10: The effect of easier credit supply on amount of monthly rent payment (in logs)
By age
All Young Old
By location (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: All
Deregulation index -0.0077** -0.0089** -0.0093** -0.0101** -0.0041 -0.0056
(0.0035) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0051) (0.0055) (0.0068)
Deregulation index × 0.0039 0.0031 0.0037
Low income (0.0064) (0.0083) (0.0143)
B: Urban
Deregulation index -0.0109*** -0.0099** -0.0130*** -0.0134** -0.0061 -0.0003
(0.0039) (0.0047) (0.0043) (0.0056) (0.0068) (0.0068)
Deregulation index × -0.0039 0.0017 -0.0171
Low income (0.0095) (0.0103) (0.0161)
C: Rural
Deregulation index -0.0012 -0.0109 -0.0065 -0.0128 0.0135 -0.0097
(0.0066) (0.0089) (0.0080) (0.0103) (0.0095) (0.0237)
Deregulation index × 0.0242 0.0181 0.0435
Low income (0.0151) (0.0143) (0.0459)
Notes: Dependent variable: Log of amount of monthly rent payment. Sample includes only observations
with positive rent payments. See notes to table 5 for further information.
for high-income, but not for low-income individuals, at the 10% significance levels. Taking a closer
look at effects by age group, we see that the strongest effects are observed among older individuals.
While the directions of the deregulation effect conform with the effects on mortgage debt, it is
surprising to see significant effects here, given that the effects on mortgage debt and home values
were insignificant, in both urban and rural areas. In general, we can say that older individuals
with higher incomes reduced their debt to value ratio in urban, but increased it in rural areas. For
older low-income individuals we observe a significant increase in the ratio relative to those with
high income in urban areas, and no significant difference between high and low income individu-
als in rural areas. Overall, these results suggest that credit expansion in this period caused only
mild increases in mortgage debt to home value ratios and these increases occurred for certain groups.
To get a better sense of whether individuals have become more financially vulnerable, we look at
the debt to income ratio. Here, we observe increases for old and low-income individuals, even though
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Table 11: The effect of easier credit supply on mortgage debt to home value ratio
By age
All Young Old
By location (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: All
Deregulation index 0.0008 0.0002 0.0017 0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0025
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Deregulation index × 0.0073 -0.0029 0.0147*
Low income (0.0050) (0.0065) (0.0076)
B: Urban
Deregulation index -0.0027 -0.0036* -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.005 -0.0080**
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0036) (0.0040)
Deregulation index × 0.0113* -0.0036 0.0214**
Low income (0.0060) (0.0067) (0.0096)
C: Rural
Deregulation index 0.0053* 0.0053* 0.0038 0.0038 0.0090* 0.0092*
(0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0049) (0.0051)
Deregulation index × 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0018
Low income (0.0081) (0.0127) (0.0124)
Notes: Dependent variable: Ratio of mortgage debt to reported home value. Sample includes only
observations with positive mortgage debt. See notes to table 5 for further information.
the effects are imprecisely estimated. A statistically stronger result is obtained for young and rural
individuals, whose debt relative to income increases by the equivalent of 37 percent of monthly
household income, per index point. This is true for both high- and low-income individuals. Thus,
while this same demographic has benefited from banking deregulation in terms of homeownership
and financial inclusion (Ce´lerier and Matray, 2019), they have at the same time increased their
vulnerability to income or home value shocks, if only slightly.
5 Further Results
The 2004 panel records whether a household lives in an MSA, but does not disclose the identity of
the MSA. We thus are not able to divide observations by the population size of the MSA for this
panel, causing the urban-rural classification to be inconsistent between the 1996 and 2001 panels
on the one hand and the 2004 panel on the other. To address concerns about the sensitivity of
our results to the urban-rural classification we repeated our estimations for different Urban clas-
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Table 12: The effect of easier credit supply on mortgage debt to household income ratio
By age
All Young Old
By location (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: All
Deregulation index 0.0791 0.0782 0.1303 0.1636* -0.0305 -0.1112
(0.0774) (0.0789) (0.0793) (0.0863) (0.1562) (0.1809)
Deregulation index × 0.0160 -0.6728 1.1928
Low income (0.4556) (0.6849) (1.2347)
B: Urban
Deregulation index -0.0365 -0.0299 -0.0736 -0.024 -0.0222 -0.1009
(0.0906) (0.0967) (0.1035) (0.1092) (0.1491) (0.1720)
Deregulation index × -0.1202 -1.0333 1.1855
Low income (0.6728) (0.8620) (1.5260)
C: Rural
Deregulation index 0.2659** 0.2504** 0.3669*** 0.3685** -0.0254 -0.0882
(0.1172) (0.1146) (0.1388) (0.1437) (0.2838) (0.2469)
Deregulation index × 0.2510 -0.0282 0.8786
Low income (0.7882) (0.8314) (1.5786)
Notes: Dependent variable: Ratio of mortgage debt to household income. Sample includes only obser-
vations with positive mortgage debt. See notes to table 5 for further information.
sifications and sub-samples. We refer the reader to table A1 – in particular columns 2 and 3 – in
the appendix for detailed results. We consider two approaches: First, we classify an observation
living in any MSA – regardless of its population – as urban, and otherwise as rural, thus having a
consistent classification across all three panels (column 2 in A1). Second, we keep our population
filter, but discard the 2004 panel. This, too, keeps the urban classification consistent across the two
panels (column 3). We then repeat our baseline estimations for various Urban classifications.19 For
the urban sample that includes all MSAs we observe two differences compared to our main results:
Deregulation increases the probability of becoming a homeowner and the probability of having a
mortgage. It appears that much of the effect of deregulation on those two outcomes is occurring in
smaller MSAs. Excluding the 2004 panel leaves our baseline results virtually unchanged.
19We only report results for estimation using various Urban classifications, with and without 2004 panel. Outcomes
for all and rural areas with corresponding specification were virtually unchanged.
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This observation is corroborated by running our regression on MSAs of different sizes. Dereg-
ulation has no effect on homeownership in consolidated MSAs,20 but the coefficient is 0.0027 in
medium sized MSAs and 0.0038 in MSAs with less than 100,000 inhabitants (albeit insignificant
in both cases). As for having a mortgage, in smaller MSAs the effect of deregulation is similar
to that of rural areas. A further observation here is that the negative effect of deregulation on
rents is significant only in consolidated, but not in medium sized and smaller MSAs, with the effect
diminishing as the MSAs become smaller.21
Lastly, we have repeated our regressions on a sample of household heads who do not change
their dwelling over the observation period. We thus abstract from any upgrading or downsizing
considerations of households. This reduces our sample by approximately half. The results are
reported in the appendix, table A2. Not surprisingly, the effect on ownership becomes virtually
zero, as it is very rare to observe people who become homeowners without at the same time changing
their dwelling. However, nearly all other coefficients are qualitatively the same, and those which
are not are insignificant for both the main and the non-mover samples.
6 Conclusion
We have analysed the effect of an increase in credit supply on the homeownership and mortgage
status as well as other housing related items of individuals’ balance sheets. To isolate changes in
credit supply from confounding factors, we have employed an index measuring the deregulation
of branch openings and acquisitions of banks, which the previous literature has shown to increase
competition among banks without having a direct effect on credit demand. Moreover, by including
individual fixed effects we rule out concerns with regard to selection into living in a particular state.
20This subgroup includes combined metropolitan areas with dense population such as New York-New Jersey-Long
Island CMSA
21The majority of our consolidated MSA observations lie within states with rent control such as California and
New York. This introduces further rigidities for substituting between rental and owner markets. Increased credit
supply may have caused temporary declines in these rental markets.
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Our main findings show that increases in credit supply in the period 1996 to 2005 have consid-
erably added to increasing ownership and mortgaging rates. Consequently, households’ mortgage
debt and house prices have increased. Since the increase in the former exceeded the increase in the
latter, the debt to value ratio increased, and so did the debt to income position of households.
However, the data revealed considerable heterogeneity in the effect of deregulation. Most im-
portantly, deregulation had much stronger effects among rural households, probably because com-
petition among banks in urban areas was already strong to begin with, while room for increased
competition existed in less populous locations. Furthermore, most of the effects of deregulation
are concentrated on young individuals, as these are more likely to change ownership status and
have a longer investment horizon. Low income households were not able to take advantage of the
opportunities provided by increased credit supply, at least with regard to the housing market.
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Appendix: Further results
35
T
ab
le
A
1:
T
h
e
eff
ec
ts
of
d
er
eg
u
la
ti
on
in
u
rb
an
ar
ea
s,
b
y
u
rb
an
cl
as
si
fi
ca
ti
on
S
a
m
p
le
B
as
el
in
e
S
IP
P
u
rb
a
n
1
9
9
6
a
n
d
1
9
9
6
a
n
d
2
0
0
1
1
9
9
6
a
n
d
2
0
0
1
1
9
9
6
a
n
d
2
0
0
1
d
efi
n
it
io
n
2
0
0
1
p
a
n
el
s
p
a
n
el
s,
la
rg
e
M
S
A
s
p
a
n
el
s,
m
ed
iu
m
M
S
A
s
p
a
n
el
s,
sm
a
ll
M
S
A
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
O
u
tc
o
m
e
Is
H
om
eo
w
n
er
0.
00
04
0.
0
0
2
5
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
0
4
0
.0
0
2
7
0
.0
0
3
8
(0
.0
01
1)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
6
)
H
as
M
or
tg
ag
e
0.
00
13
0.
0
0
3
7
*
*
0
.0
0
1
7
-0
.0
0
3
4
0
.0
0
8
2
*
*
0
.0
0
7
3
*
*
(0
.0
02
2)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
3
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
)
L
og
M
or
tg
ag
e
D
eb
t
-0
.0
13
6
-0
.0
0
4
5
-0
.0
1
6
3
-0
.0
1
7
1
-0
.0
0
8
1
0
.0
1
4
5
(0
.0
11
5)
(0
.0
0
8
9
)
(0
.0
1
2
7
)
(0
.0
2
7
7
)
(0
.0
0
9
6
)
(0
.0
1
2
3
)
L
og
H
om
e
V
al
u
e
-0
.0
01
0
0.
0
0
2
9
-0
.0
0
3
1
-0
.0
1
3
5
0
.0
1
1
0
*
0
.0
1
5
2
*
*
(0
.0
05
7)
(0
.0
0
4
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
1
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
7
3
)
L
og
M
or
tg
ag
e
P
ay
m
en
t
-0
.0
02
6
-0
.0
0
2
1
-0
.0
0
2
3
-0
.0
0
3
4
0
.0
0
2
1
-0
.0
0
0
1
(0
.0
03
5)
(0
.0
0
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
L
og
R
en
t
-0
.0
10
9*
**
-0
.0
1
0
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
6
*
*
-0
.0
1
5
6
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
7
-0
.0
0
5
3
(0
.0
03
9)
(0
.0
0
3
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
D
eb
t
to
V
al
u
e
-0
.0
02
7
-0
.0
0
0
4
-0
.0
0
1
9
-0
.0
0
2
8
-0
.0
0
1
4
0
.0
0
3
8
(0
.0
02
2)
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
5
)
D
eb
t
to
In
co
m
e
-0
.0
36
5
0.
0
3
0
0
-0
.0
2
3
2
-0
.0
3
6
6
-0
.0
1
4
1
0
.2
0
1
6
(0
.0
90
6)
(0
.0
7
8
5
)
(0
.1
0
2
6
)
(0
.1
6
8
7
)
(0
.1
5
9
7
)
(0
.1
6
9
3
)
N
ot
es
:
C
el
l
en
tr
ie
s
ar
e
th
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
eff
ec
t
o
f
d
er
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
o
n
th
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
g
iv
en
in
th
e
ro
w
.
L
a
rg
e
M
S
A
s
a
re
co
n
so
li
d
a
te
d
M
S
A
s
(C
M
S
A
).
M
ed
iu
m
M
S
A
s
ar
e
M
S
A
s
w
h
ic
h
a
re
n
o
t
C
M
S
A
s,
b
u
t
h
av
e
a
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
g
re
a
te
r
th
a
n
1
0
0
,0
0
0
.
S
m
a
ll
M
S
A
s
a
re
M
S
A
s
w
it
h
p
op
u
la
ti
on
s
sm
al
le
r
th
an
10
0,
00
0.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
o
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
sa
m
e
co
n
tr
o
ls
a
s
li
st
ed
in
th
e
n
o
te
s
to
ta
b
le
3
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
**
*
p
-v
al
u
e<
0.
01
,
**
p
-v
al
u
e<
0.
05
,
*
p
-v
al
u
e<
0
.1
.
36
Table A2: The effect of easier credit supply on non-movers
Sample Full Urban Rural Full Urban Rural
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Ownership Status Is Homeowner Has Mortgage
Coefficient 0.0009 0.001 0.0007 0.0041** 0.003 0.0062**
Standard errors (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0027)
Number observations 117,390 78,518 38,872 117,390 78,518 38,872
B: Home Equity Log Mortgage Debt Log Home Value
Coefficient -0.0015 -0.0169 0.0303*** 0.0041 0.0015 0.0109
Standard error (0.0090) (0.0129) (0.0093) (0.0049) (0.0062) (0.0069)
Number observations 46,466 31,974 14,492 71,590 47,308 24,282
C: Housing Cost Log Mortgage Payment Log Rent
Coefficient 0.0029 -0.0037 0.0178*** -0.0056 -0.0071* -0.0002
Standard error (0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0068) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0104)
Number observations 52,748 36,228 16,520 19,558 14,489 5,069
D: Leverage Debt to Value Debt to Income
Coefficient -0.0008 -0.0036 0.0039 0.0462 -0.0853 0.3089***
Standard error (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0911) (0.1042) (0.1152)
Number observations 44,589 30,750 13,839 43156 29,701 13,455
Notes: The coefficients report the estimated effect of a relaxation of inter-state banking by one index
point. The sample only includes household heads who have stayed in the same dwelling throughout the
panel. See notes to 3 for further information. Standard errors are clustered by state-years and reported
in parentheses. *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1.
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Table A3: The effect of easier credit supply and mortgage status on reported home value (in logs)
By age
All Young Old
By location (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: All
Deregulation index 0.0046 -0.0076 0.0125** -0.0034 -0.0041 -0.0107
(0.0044) (0.0076) (0.0057) (0.0135) (0.0056) (0.0084)
Has mortgage 0.0999*** 0.0724*** 0.0903*** 0.0616* 0.1023*** 0.0834***
(0.0158) (0.0209) (0.0248) (0.0314) (0.0189) (0.0254)
Deregulation index × 0.0159** 0.0177 0.0106
Has mortgage (0.0080) (0.0136) (0.0101)
B: Urban
Deregulation index -0.001 -0.0104 0.0052 0.0132 -0.0078 -0.0203*
(0.0057) (0.0100) (0.0069) (0.0164) (0.0080) (0.0120)
Has mortgage 0.0803*** 0.0578** 0.0669** 0.0824* 0.0852*** 0.0488
(0.0176) (0.0259) (0.0288) (0.0425) (0.0206) (0.0301)
Deregulation index × 0.0120 -0.0088 0.0190
Has mortgage (0.0087) (0.0172) (0.0111)
C: Rural
Deregulation index 0.0145** -0.0043 0.0262*** -0.019 0.0006 -0.0011
(0.0072) (0.0120) (0.0100) (0.0222) (0.0094) (0.0138)
Has mortgage 0.1171*** 0.0767** 0.1089** 0.0327 0.1185*** 0.1135***
(0.0297) (0.0329) (0.0448) (0.0485) (0.0362) (0.0432)
Deregulation index × 0.0261* 0.0520* 0.0031
Has mortgage (0.0154) (0.0231) (0.0209)
Notes: Dependent variable: Log of amount of reported home value. Sample includes only home owners.
See notes to table 5 for further information.
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